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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20061120-CA

GREGORY JENKINS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Jenkins' motion to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 76-66).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the
Addenda.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Gregory Jenkins appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the
Fourth District Court after he was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled
substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Gregory Jenkins was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on
August 16, 2005 with possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and possession of
drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 2-1).
A petition for inquiry into Jenkins' competency was filed on November 17, 2005
and a competency evaluation was ordered (R. 53-52, 58-54). After evaluation, Jenkins
was found competent to proceed (R. 61).
A preliminary hearing was held on January 18, 2006 and Jenkins was bound over
for trial on both charges upon a finding of probable cause (R. 64, 221).
On February 17, 2006 Jenkins filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of the warrantless search of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (R. 79-71). Argument was heard on the motion on March 8,
2006 at which time it was denied by the Honorable Lynn W. Davis (R. 89, 222).
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A jury trial was held on April 10, 2006 with Judge Davis presiding (R. 155-53,
223). After deliberation. Jenkins was found guilty of both counts (R. 148, 154, 223: 94).
On July 12, 2006 Jenkins was ordered to complete a sixty-day diagnostic
evaluation at the Utah Stale Prison (R. 198-97). On September 20, 2006 Jenkins was
sentenced to 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison and 365 days in the Utah State Prison to
be served concurrent with each other and with his other cases (R. 218-16).
On October 20, 2006 a notice of appeal was filed in Fourth District Court (R. 220).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Preliminary Hearing
Troy Beebe, a detective with the Utah County Major Crimes, testified that on
August 30, 2005 he was called to assist at an ongoing incident of a suicidal male with a
gun who was blocking traffic at 1200 North, 500 West in Provo (R. 221: 5, 6). Police set
up a perimeter from ''Bulldog to some distance to the South on 500 West" (Id.). A
SWAT team was on standby and negotiators were also present along with numerous
police cars (R. 221: 6, 14). Beebe classified it as a "major incident" (R. 221: 6).
Columbia Lane was not blocked off by police (R. 221: 15). Beebe has been associated
with the task force for nearly three years, and is a certified drug recognition expert for
DUI(R. 221:8-9).
Beebe was outside the perimeter on Columbia Lane and pulled into the 7-Eleven
parking lot (R. 221: 6, 15). As he pulled in behind the 7-Eleven, he noticed Jenkins
crouched down on the back corner of 7-Eleven; and when he pulled in, Jenkins began
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"walking crouched down, using my vehicle as a shield to block him from view of people
to the east which were police officers. He was crouching and walking along the side of
my vehicle" (R. 221: 6, 16. 17). He looked "nervous, very suspicious in nature" and had
sores on his face (R. 221: 6-7, 19).
Beebe, who was dressed in plain clothes and in an unmarked vehicle, stopped in
front of a dumpster and got out of his vehicle (R. 221: 7, 16). As he stopped, Jenkins ran
westbound behind 7-Eleven towards the U-haul business, which was next to the
convenience store (R. 221: 7, 17-18). Beebe requested another officer from dispatch,
had his badge out, and then chased Jenkins because he didn't "know whether he was part
of the incident... whether he had burglarized a store or committed a crime; he was just
suspicious in nature" (R. 221: 7, 19). Beebe, however, had not received any reports of
any other crimes other than the possible suicidal male (R. 221: 19-20).
Jenkins came out from behind a U-haul trailer behind the business and Beebe
asked to see his hands, and advised that he was a police officer (R. 221: 8, 20). Jenkins
cooperated (R. 221: 8). Beebe was satisfied that Jenkins didn't have any weapons nor
was he a physical threat (R. 221: 20). Beebe asked Jenkins what he was doing, and
Jenkins informed him that he was trying to get close to the scene in order to take
photographs (R. 221: 8). Beebe did not see a camera at that time (R. 221: 8). A camera
was found in the backpack (R. 221: 23).
Beebe asked him for identification and Jenkins advised that it was in his bag, and
produced it (R. 221: 8, 20). Beebe took possession of the ID. card and wanted to run a
check on it (R. 221: 20, 21). This was about the same time the marked patrol unit he
4

requested arrived to assist (R. 221: 21). Beebe handed the I.D. card to the other officer,
who then ran a warrants check through his radio (R. 221: 22).
Beebe noticed Jenkins' speech was fast and repetitive, and that his pupils appeared
to be dilated (R. 221: 9). In addition, he had open sores on his face and arms (R. 221: 9).
Beebe testified that the significance of open sores is that the chemicals "used to
manufacture methamphetamine will often leach out through the skin causing sores'' (R.
221: 9). Jenkins also did not stand still despite Beebe daring him to do so (R. 221: 10).
He testified that methamphetamine is a stimulant, which elevates the nervous system and
makes it hard for individuals to remain still (R. 221: 10).
Jenkins was questioned about methamphetamine use (R. 221: 11, 22). Beebe was
told that Jenkins had used within the last four hours, and that he'd recently fallen "back
into the drug culture" due to the death of his mother and issues with a boyfriend (R. 221:
11, 22). Beebe asked Jenkins if he had any methamphetamine in his bag (R. 221: 10).
Jenkins said that he did but that it belonged to a friend (R. 221: 10). At his request
Jenkins retrieved it from a black cloth bag in his backpack (R. 221: 10). Inside was a
small baggy with a white crystalline substance (R. 221: 11). It was sent to the crime lab
and was identified as methamphetamine residue (R. 221: 12). After producing the
methamphetamine, Jenkins was read his Miranda rights and was in custody (R. 221: 22).
Beebe testified that his encounter with Jenkins took place within a thousand feet
of the Provo River Parkway and within a thousand feet of exchange park (R. 221: 12).
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B. Trial Testimony
1. Troy Beebe
On August 13, 2005 was enroute to Deseret Industiries when he passed 500 West
in Provo and observed a situation involving a heavy police presence (R. 223: 21). Police
had cordoned off the intersection of 500 West and Bulldog Boulevard, including the area
directly in front of the hospital parking structure (R. 223: 21). Beebe dropped off
something at Deseret Industries and then drove across Columbia Lane into the 7-Eleven
parking lot, which was outside the barricaded area (R. 223: 21, 22, 29). He pulled into
the east side between Quiznos, Check City and the convenience store (R. 223: 21). He
was not in uniform (R. 223: 22).
As he slowly pulled in between the buildings, he noticed Jenkins crouched down
on the northeast corner of the 7-Eleven looking eastward towards the commotion (R. 223:
22). Intending to assist with the situation, he continued driving towards the dumpster
area to park his vehicle (R. 223: 22-23). As he did so, Jenkins was walking in a crouched
position, using his Dodge Dakota truck as a shield from police and others on the other
side—like he didn't want to be observed (R. 223: 23).
Beebe stopped abruptly, grabbed his cell phone, and got out of the vehicle (R. 223:
23). As he walked to the rear of his truck, he saw Jenkins running westbound from the 7Eleven towards the U-Haul business (R. 223: 23). He requested assistance from a
marked unit and gave chase (R. 223: 24).
He observed Jenkins walking out from behind one of the trailers and stopped him
(R. 223: 24). He asked Jenkins to show his hands, and Jenkins cooperated (R. 223: 24).
6

With his police badge visible, he identified himself and asked wrhat Jenkins was doing
and was informed that Jenkins was trying to take photographs of the incident (R. 223: 24,
32). Beebe asked if Jenkins was trying to avoid the police and Jenkins indicated he was
trying to get past the police to take photographs (R. 223: 24).
Beebe noticed Jenkins had sores about his face and arms, his pupils were dilated,
his speech was fast and repetitive, and he had difficulty holding still (R. 223: 24). Beebe
testified that these physical characteristics were consistent with the use of stimulants (R.
223: 37).
Beebe asked if Jenkins had used methamphetamine and Jenkins admitted to using
within the last four hours (R. 223: 25). He then asked if Jenkins had any
methamphetamine on him of "anything on him [he] needed to know about," and Jenkins
indicated that he did (R. 223: 25, 35). Beebe and Jenkins then waited for backup to arrive
at which time Beebe asked Jenkins for his identification and the methamphetamine (R.
223: 25). Jenkins did as he was directed and told Beebe that the methamphetamine
belonged to a friend (R. 223: 25). Inside the little black bag that Jenkins gave Beebe
were glass pipes with char marks, tubes, syringes, a soup spoon and baggies containing
residue of a white crystal substance (R. 223: 26-27, 31, 37). Beebe testified that at the
time of contact with Jenkins, there was enough methamphetamine in the baggies for use
(R. 223: 36). Both baggies were sent to the State Crime Lab (R. 223: 38). One of the
baggies was tested and it showed positive for methamphetamine (R. 223: 38,47, 50).
The area where Jenkins was stopped was 264 feet from a park (R. 223: 28).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The level two seizure and detention of Jenkins, which led to the search of his
person and property, was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion and therefore
violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In addition, all evidence discovered after that unlawful detention must be excluded as
fruits of the poisonous tree.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING JENKINS' MOTION
TO SUPPRESS WHERE THE LEVEL TWO SEIZURE AND
DETENTIO WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE
SUSPICION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable seizures. U. S. Const., Amend. IV. Its protections "extend to brief
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). See State v.
Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10, 112 P.3d 507.
This Court has identified three permissible levels of police stops: "(1) An officer
may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime...; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been
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committed or is being committed/' Markland, 2005 UT 26 at n.l (citing State v.
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)).
Jenkins filed a motion to suppress the evidence claiming he was subjected to an
illegal search and seizure, which violated his right under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (R. 79-71). Specifically, he argued that the encounter between
Officer Beebe and Jenkins was a level two seizure and detention, which was not
supported by reasonable suspicion; and therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of
that illegal detention must be suppressed. Argument was heard on the motion on March 8,
2006, at which time it was denied by the Honorable Lynn W. Davis (R. 89, 222).
In denying the motion, Judge Davis concluded that based on the totality of
circumstances reasonable suspicion existed for the seizure and detention of Jenkins (R.
222: 13-14). Specifically, the trial court pointed to the fact that there was a crime scene
with multiple officers in the area, that Jenkins was "utilizing an officer's vehicle to screen
himself from view;" that this "strange" activity was observed by an officer, who was
trained in drug recognition and who also observed sores on Jenkins' face; and that when
the officer exited his vehicle and identified himself, the individual ran (R. 222: 14-15).
A level one police stop "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to
an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time" during the questioning." State v.
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990). See also State v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f
11, 998 P.2d 274. However, a person is seized under the Fourth Amendment where there
is show of authority or physical force by the officer that suggests or demonstrates that the
citizen is no longer free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446. U.S. 544, 554, 100
9

S.Ct. 1870. 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Hence, under these circumstances a level one
encounter becomes a level two detention. 'This is true 'even if the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention brief.'" Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at ^ 11 (quoting State
v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991)). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d (1979). Such circumstances which indicate a
level two seizure include: the presence of several officers, the display of a weapon,
physical touching, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with
the officer's request might be compelled. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at
1877. Generally ''when a person's identification or other important papers are taken by a
law enforcement officer, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave." Ray, 2000
UT App 55 at 114.
Jenkins asserts that at its inception, his encounter with Beebe was a level two
seizure requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion. Beebe was in an unmarked vehicle
and dressed in plain clothes (R. 221: 7, 16). As he pulled into the parking lot he noticed
Jenkins, who began to crouch down and use his vehicle as a shield (R. 221: 6, 16, 17).
Beebe was there because of an ongoing incident nearby concerning a suicidal male where
police had set up a perimeter (R. 221: 5, 6). At no time were Beebe inside the perimeter,
but were a distance away.
Because Jenkins looked "nervous, very suspicious" and had sores on his face,
Beebe stopped his vehicle and got out (R. 221: 6-7, 19). As he stopped, Jenkins began to
run (R. 221: 7, 17-18). Beebe pulled out his badge, requested another officer from
dispatch, and chased Jenkins (R. 221: 7, 19). Beebe indicated he didn't "know whether
10

[Jenkins] was part of the [ongoing] incident... whether he had burglarized a store or
committed a crime: he was just suspicious in nature" (R. 221: 7. 19). Beebe. however,
had not received any reports of other crimes other than the suicidal male in the ongoing
perimeter situation (R. 221: 19-20).
When Jenkins came out from behind a U-Haul trailer, Beebe immediately asked to
see his hands and identified himself to Jenkins (R. 221: 20). His badge was visible (R.
223: 24, 32). Beebe was satisfied Jenkins had no weapons and posed no physical threat
(R. 221: 20). Beebe asked why Jenkins was in the area and was told he wanted to take
pictures of the perimeter situation, and a camera was found in his backpack (R. 221: 8,
23). Beebe noticed Jenkins had sores on his face and arms, that his pupils were dilated,
his speech fast and repetitive, and that he had difficulty holding still (R. 221: 9-10, 223:
24). Because these characteristics could be consistent with drug use, Beebe questioned
Jenkins about drug use and Jenkins subsequently gave him paraphernalia and a baggie
with a white crystal substance that was methamphetamine (R. 221: 10-12, 22, 223: 26-27,
31,37,38,47,50).
Under the totality of these circumstances, Jenkins asserts that this was a level two
encounter. Before they even spoke Beebe had called for backup and had given chase.
Then immediately after the two came face to face, Beebe commanded Jenkins to show
his hands. Clearly, Jenkins was not free to ignore that request and walk away,
particularly when several other officers were nearby due to the circumstances involving
the suicidal male. He was compelled to obey. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, 112
P.3d 507 (Level two encounter where officer responded to apartment complex on report
11

of individual screaming for help. Officer encounters defendant and questions him about
his presence in area, takes identification and runs warrants check. Defendant was
arrested on warrant and searched incident to arrest); and State wTrujillo, 739 P.2d 85
(Utah App. 1987) (Level two seizure occurred when defendant was pat down by officer).
Cf. State v. Adams, 158 P.3d 1134, 2007 UT App 117, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 1264 (Utah
2007) (Level one encounter because only one officer present, no show of force or
speaking by officer in commanding tone or with authoritative language. Defendant
admitted officer was nice).
Because Jenkins was seized in a level two encounter, that detention must be
supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, which is
considered under the totality of circumstances. It takes more than an inchoate and
unparticularized hunch to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1969). See also, State v. Markland, 2005 UT
26, \ 10, 112 P.3d 507. An officer's suspicion must be supported by specific facts and
rational inferences. MarklanddX\ 10. When reviewing a given factual situation for
reasonable suspicion this Court views the totality of circumstances and judge the conduct
of the officer[s] in light of "common sense and ordinary human experience" giving the
officer deference "to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." Markland at
% 11 (citations omitted). An "officer must be able to articulate what it is about those facts
which leads to an inference of criminal activity. If the officer fails or is unable to do so,
his suspicion is classed as a mere 'hunch' rather than an articulable suspicion." State v.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990).
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Beebe was able to articulate the following in relation to his decision to seize
Jenkins. Jenkins had sores on his face, was lingering in the area, and was using his
unmarked vehicle as a shield. Beebe testified that Jenkins looked "nervous, very
suspicious/' He indicated that he didn't "know whether [Jenkins] was part of the
[ongoing] incident... whether he had burglarized a store or committed a crime; he was
just suspicious in nature." Beebe, however, had not received any reports of other crimes
other than the suicidal male in the ongoing perimeter situation. Although Beebe testified
that he noticed sores on Jenkins' face, he did not articulate any concerns of drug use or
possession at the time he decided to stop Jenkins. In fact, he didn't articulate any
suspicions of drug activity at this time. The only crimes he mentioned specifically were
burglary and what was taking place inside the police perimeter. However, Beebe had not
received any reports of other crimes, and they were well outside the perimeter. Jenkins
asserts he was seized because of Beebe's hunch that he was "suspicious" rather than
based on articulable, reasonable suspicion that he had committed, or was committing, a
crime.
In Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274 (Utah App. 2000), uniformed officers were
dispatched to a convenience store because a "suspicious" female had been in front of the
store for two hours. Id. at f 2-3. Identification was requested and the woman was
subsequently questioned about her presence and appeared nervous and agitated, and she
talked fast and repeatedly shifted her weight from one foot to the other. Id. at f 5, 13.
Officers asked her about drugs and weapons or "anything" they "should know about,"
and she denied anything. Id. at f 6. Officers asked to search her bags and she consented.
13

Paraphernalia was found. Id. at f 6. This Court concluded that "at the time of the
seizure, it is clear there was no reasonable articulable suspicion supporting the seizure.
First, the facts known to the officers regarding Ray were at least as consistent with lawful
behavior as with the commission of a crime. The testimony of [the officers] resolves the
question. By their own testimony, [the officers] had no knowledge of any violation of the
law that Ray might have committed or was about to commit. Accordingly, there is no
basis on which to justify the level two stop, and the seizure, therefore, violated Ray's
rights under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at f 19. Ray looked "suspicious" and appeared
"nervous," agitated, talked fast and shifted her weight repeatedly. These facts—which
are strikingly similar to Beebe's articulated facts—were insufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure.
Jenkins acknowledges that officers are not required to rule out innocent conduct
prior to conducting an investigatory stop. Nonetheless, they are still required to
articulate, which along with rational inferences, point to reasonable criminal activity.
State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10, 112 P.3d 507. Jenkins asserts that Markland is
distinguishable from this case. In Markland there had been a report of a criminal activity
and a woman screaming for help. The officer involved was the first responder to the
area. In addition, the defendant in Markland gave an explanation about his presence in
the area which was inconsistent with his actions. In this case, the only reported criminal
activity concerned the on-going situation involving a suicidal male which was being
handled by numerous officers, including a SWAT team, who had already established a
perimeter. Beebe mentioned being concerned about possible burglary, but he had
14

received no such reports. Moreover, Jenkins was outside the perimeter and was in fact
moving away from it. It is understandable that police would not want citizens to interfere
with the on-going situation or to cross the perimeter. However, there was no indication
that Jenkins was doing any such thing. He simply appeared "suspicious'' and "nervous."
He asserts that his observed behaviors do not constitute reasonable and articulable
suspicion. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Beebe's detention and subsequent arrest of Jenkins constituted a Fourth
Amendment violation requiring exclusion of all evidence obtained as a result of that
unlawful seizure. "Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted
by the violation of a person's constitutional rights." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f 62
(citations omitted). The purpose of excluding such evidence is to "compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive
to disregard it." Brown v. Illinois, 411 U.S. 590, 599-600, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 Led.2d 416
(1975) (citation omitted). See also Hansen at \ 62. Here the purpose of the illegal
conduct was to improperly seize Jenkins. Supressing the evidence clearly will have the
desired deterrent effect. Moreover, there were not intervening factors which would
mitigate the illegality nor was there any significant lapse in time between the initial
illegal detention and discovery of the methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Hansen at ff
64-69. Therefore, Jenkins asserts that exclusion of all evidence obtained as a result of the
unlawful seizure and detention must be suppressed.

15

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Jenkins requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress and his conviction, and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further
pioceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March, 2008.

Margaret?. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 26th day of March, 2008.

Margau?et P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appelk
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SHAWN HO^ ELL (#10067)
UTAH COUNTS PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC
Attome) foi Defendant
245 North Unnersit) A\e
Pro\o Utah 84601
Telephone (801)852 1070
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT STATE OF UTAH,
UTAH COUNTY PROVO DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Case No 051401345
Judge LYNN W DAVIS

GREGORY JENKINS,
Defendant

The Defendant, Gregory Jenkins through his attorney, Shawn How ell, respectfully moves
this Court to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure Mr Jenkins bases his
motion on the following memorandum
FACTS
1

On August 30, 2005, there was an on-going incident involving a suicidal male with a gun,
occurring in the area of 1200 North and 500 West in Provo Preliminary Hearing Transcnpt,
hereinafter "Transcnpt" p 5, In 12, 22

2

Patrol units set up a penmeter from Bulldog Avenue to some distance south on 500 West
Transcnpt, p 5, In 23-25 Police cars were blocking off all four lanes of 500 West and
cnme-scene tape was used to block off the entire intersection from 1200 N to the west corner
-1-

by Quizno's and Check City. Transcript, p. 14, 15-18. At the preliminary hearing, Officer
Bebee was unsure of what had happened with those businesses, but stated it was possible that
people were coming and going from those businesses during that time. Transcript, p. 14, In.
22-25. p. 15, In. 1. Columbia Lane was open for travel from east to west. Transcript, p. 15,
ln.5.
3.

Officer Troy Beebe was in the area and stopped to help. Transcript, p. 13, In. 9-10. Officer
Bebee was in plain clothes with a necklace badge and traveling in an unmarked Dodge
Dakota truck. Transcript, p. 17, In. 11 -13. The incident had been ongoing for sometime when
Officer Bebee arrived. Transcript, p. 6, In. 3.

4.

Officer Bebee arrived outside the area of the boundary that had been established. He
estimates less than half a block outside the perimeter. Transcript, p. 6, In. 8-12.

5.

Officer Bebee pulled into the 7-Eleven parking lot located off of Columbia Lane and pulled
towards the back of the 7-Eleven. Transcript, p. 6, In. 15-16. The multi-use building
containing Check City and Quiznos separates 7-Eleven from 500 West. Transcript, p. 15,
In. 14-18.

6.

As Officer Bebee pulled towards the back he noticed Mr. Jenkins crouched down on the back
corner (the southeast corner) of the 7-Eleven. Transcript, p. 16, In. 18-19. As Officer Bebee
approached, Mr. Jenkins started walking towards Officer Bebee's truck and then crouched
down and walked alongside the truck. Transcript, p. 16, In. 21-23.

7.

As Officer Bebee observed him, he felt Mr. Jenkins looked "nervous" and "very suspicious
in nature." Transcript, p. 7, In. 1-2.
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7.

As Officer Bebee parked his truck, Mr. Jenkins turned and ran, westbound, away from the
ongoing incident and its perimeter, behind 7-Eleven towards the U-Haul. Transcript, p. 7,
In. 6-9.

8.

Officer Bebee then made a phone call to dispatch and requested that another officer respond.
He then proceeded to chase Mr. Jenkins. Transcript, p. 7, In. 21-23.

9.

Officer Bebee indicated that he pursued Mr. Jenkins because 'lie was just suspicious in
nature and in [his] movements." Transcript, p. 8, In. 3-4.

10.

Mr. Jenkins came out from behind a U-Haul trailer located behind the U-Haul building.
Officer Bebee gave a verbal command to stop (Transcript, p. 19. In. 8-9) and asked Mr.
Jenkins to show his hands and advised him that he was a police officer. Transcript, p. 8, In.
11-12. This satisfied Officer Bebee that Mr. Jenkins was not armed and was not presenting
a physical threat. Transcript, p. 20, In. 11-14.

11.

Officer bebee asked Mr. Jenkins what he was doing. Mr. Jenkins responded that he was
trying to take photographs and get a closer look at what was going on. Transcript, p.8, In.
15-17.
ARGUMENT
"Searches and seizures are per se unreasonable if concluded outside the judicial process and

without a warrant, unless the exigencies of the situation justify an exception." State v. Lee. 633 P.2d
48, 50 (Utah 1981), see also. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967). Furthermore, "the State must demonstrate 'that the circumstances of the seizure constitute
an exception to the warrant requirement."5 State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(citations omitted).
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The initial seizure and detention of Mr. Jenkins was not supported by a warrant, probable
cause or even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and therefore was a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure. Any evidence found as a result of the unlawful
detention should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
A, Mr. Jenkins was detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures.
The Utah Court of Appeals has established that "[t]here are generally three levels of
constitutionally permissible encounters between law enforcement officers and the public:
'(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as the
citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however,
the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop*; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998
P.2d 274, 277 (UtahCt.App.2000) (citations omitted).
It is the defendant's position that this was a level two stop that needed to be supported by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
1. The encounter between Mr. Jenkins and Officer Bebee constitutes a Level Two stop.
"A level one encounter 'is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's
inquiries but is free to leave at any time.'" Id, (quoting State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah
Ct.App.1990). A level two stop occurs "when the officer 'by means of physical force or show of
authority has in some way restrained the liberty' of a person." Id (citations omitted). What has
started as a level one stop can escalate to a level two stop and become "a seizure under the fourth
amendment.. .when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she
is not free to leave." Id. Circumstances the Utah Court of Appeals has provided that contribute to
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when a seizure has taken place, even when the person has not attempted to leave, include uthe
threatening presence of several officers/' and "the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.** Id. at 277. It appears that the critical
issue for the Court's determination is whether, under the circumstances. w'a reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave." Id at 280.
a. A reasonable person would not have felt free to leave during the encounter
that occurred between Mr. Jenkins and Officer Bebee.
In the present case, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Mr. Jenkins
did not feel free to leave nor would any other reasonable person have felt free to leave. From the
beginning of Mr. Jenkins contact with Officer Bebee, Officer Bebee asserted his authority as a police
officer indicating that Mr. Jenkins was to obey him. Officer Bebee testified that after pursuing Mr.
Jenkins and then coming face to face with him, Officer Bebee commanded that Mr. Jenkins show
his hands. This command alone suggests that Mr. Jenkins would not at that point have been free to
simply ignore the command and walk away; he was compelled to obey. In giving the command,
Officer Bebee also advised that he was a police officer. Though he was not in uniform, he did have
a badge on a chain around his neck that would have been visible at this time. Notably, Mr. Jenkins
was stopped by Officer Bebee after moving away from the perimeter of the on-going incident.
Based upon those facts, it is apparent a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when
stopped by a police officer, who subsequently gave a command to show one's hands.
2. No reasonable suspicion supported the level two stop and therefore the detention of
Mr. Jenkins was illegal.
A level two detention "must be supported by reasonable suspicion [or it] violates the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Salt Lake City v. Ray at 280. The inquiry into
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reasonable suspicion uses a "totality of facts and circumstances approach . . . to determine if there
are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." Id. "[An] officer
must be able to articulate what it is about those facts which leads to an inference of criminal activity.
If the officer fails or is unable to do so, his suspicion is classed as a mere "hunch" rather than an
articulable suspicion." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990).
The facts that were known at the time of the seizure were: (1) there was an ongoing incident
and perimeter set up to contain that incident; (2) an unidentified male was lingering near the corner
of 7-Eleven and "used" Officer Bebee's truck as a visual shield, (3) Officer Bebee was not in
uniform nor was his truck marked; and (4) when officer Bebee parked his truck, the male ran away
from the perimeter of the incident.
Nothing in Mr. Jenkins' actions suggest that he was involved in criminal activity, either
relating to the on-going incident or some unrelated, unreported crime. Mr. Jenkins was not observed
crossing the perimeter, attempting to cross the perimeter, or even within an especially close
proximity to the perimeter. It is understandable that the police officers would not have wanted the
perimeter to be crossed by citizens. However, Mr. Jenkins did not even come close to doing so.
Additionally, there is a multi-use building located between where Mr. Jenkins was first observed and
where the sidewalk/perimeter was established. Officer Bebee indicated that he is unsure whether
the businesses in the multi-use building were shut down during this time, but that it was possible
that people were coming and going out of those businesses during this incident. Transcript, p. 14,
In. 19-25, p. 15, In. 1. Travel had not been restricted along Columbia Lane. Transcript, p. 15, In. 2-5.
When Mr. Jenkins ran, he ran away from the incident.
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at the wrecked cars. Officer Bebee did not explain why approaching, without crossing, a police
barricade is illegal.
While an officer is not required to rule out innocent conduct prior to conducting an
investigatory stop, he is still required to point to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. State v. Markland, 112 P.3d 507, 510 (Utah 2005). Officer Bebee failed to do this.
It seems if any response to Mr. Jenkins actions would have been appropriate it would have
been to instruct him to go away. Of course this would have been unnecessary because Mr. Jenkins
ran away from the direction of the incident at that time while still most likely being unaware that
Officer Bebee was a police officer. It simply is not indicative of criminal activity and not a basis for
detaining Mr. Jenkins.1
B. Evidence obtained as a result of the illegal detention should be suppressed as "fruit of the
poisonous tree/ 9
The Court should find that, at its inception, the detention was illegal for lacking reasonable
suspicion. Because the detention was illegal, the evidence, including but not limited to statements
and physical evidence, discovered as a result of the illegal detention is fruit of the poisonous tree and
should be suppressed. See State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988) ("absent
reasonable suspicion, evidence derived from the stop is fruit of the poisonous tree").

1

Markland is distinguishable factually from the present case in the following ways: (1) in
Markland there had been a report of criminal activity and the officer involved was the first
responder to the area after the call, unlike the present case where the only reported criminal
activity was an on-going incident being handled by numerous officers before Officer Bebee
arrived; and (2) the defendant in Markland gave an explanation about what he was doing that was
inconsistent with his actions, here, the defendant's explanation of his actions was consistent with
observable fact.
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The only fact that could possibly have given Officer Bebee any concern was Mr. Jenkins
actions of appearing to use his truck as a visual shield from the police officers attending to the
incident on 500 W. However, Officer Bebee was not able to articulate a specific suspicion that he
thought Mr. Jenkins was involved in any criminal activity, at least a suspicion founded by the
circumstances of known fact. Officer Bebee indicated he felt Mr. Jenkins was suspicious, that ''at
that time I didn't know whether he was a part of the incident, that he had - whether he had
burglarized a store or committed a crime; he was just suspicious in nature and in the movements of
Mr. Jenkins" Transcript, p. 8, In. 1-4. Officer Bebee did not have a description of the male involved
in the incident, that he can recall (Transcript, p. 15, In. 6-8), but the incident had been ongoing and
presumably was somewhat under control at that time, the area of the incident having been cordoned
off He was not able to articulate why he thought Mr. Jenkins might be involved in the on-going
incident. Officer Bebee went farther to state that "[Mr. Jenkins] was just suspicious in nature. I
didn't know what he had done or why he was trying to place himself between my vehicle and the
police that were numerous to the east of it." Transcript, p. 19, In. 20-22. Officer Bebee testified that
he had not received report of any other crimes underway. Transcript, p. 19, In. 23-25. The fact that
Mr. Jenkins was simply "acting odd" does not meet the standard of an articulable suspicion of
criminal activity, {See Transcript, p. 20, In. 9), and is more indicative that Officer Bebee was acting
upon a "mere 'hunch'" when he stopped Mr. Jenkins.
To echo the Court's analysis in Salt Lake City v. Ray, "First, the facts known to the officers
regarding [the defendant] were at least as consistent with lawful behavior as with the commission
of a crime." 998 P.2d at 281. It is a common experience that members of the public attempt to
observe ongoing police actions, for example bottle necks in traffic as motorists try to catch a glimpse
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CONCLUSION
The Defendant asks this Court to suppress any and all evidence that was found as a result of
the illegal detention, consistent with the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine.
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DATED this

?) day of February, 2006.
/'

SHAWN HOWFiLL J
Attorney for Defendant
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